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Gibbes: The Relationship of Law and Medicine
THE RELATIONSHIP OF LAW AND MEDICINE
J. Hi YwAaD

GIBBeS*

In The Republic Plato undertakes, through deductive reasoning,
to find a suitable definition of justice. He more or less readily succeeds in depicting the other cardinal virtues, temperance, courage,
and wisdom; he finds justice more elusive, and it requires much
thinking, with a trial and error method of dialogue technique, for
him to come to the conclusion that "the division of labour has
shown us the right way to the knowledge of justice- when each
one has and does his rightful share, then will justice be realized".
Plato's definition has, then, been summarized by the statement that
justice prevails when each one attends to his own business.
As regards law and medicine, it might well be that the ends of justice would be better served if their paths did not cross, if their respective businesses were well done, and if they did not run the risk
of obscuring justice through a merging of their spheres. This possibility remains, however, an ideal in that it can not be brought to
reality in human affairs. The paths of law and medicine do cross,
and it becomes important to see if this crossing is made in the interest of justice or otherwise.
Aristotle tells us that "he who sees things grow from their beginning will have the finest view of them". It may be, then, worthwhile if we can picture, in brief form, the evolution of medicine and
law as we know them today.
LAw

The word law comes from the Anglo-Saxon lagu meaning "things
lying in due place", hence, an orderly arrangement. As applied to
human society, it is probable that the need for such rules of conduct was among the earliest felt when mankind found it advisable
and expidient to band together in some form of social state. His
natural instincts, to get and to beget, had to be curbed in the interests
of the public good, while liberty of action for the individual was retained in maximum degree- just so long as such action did not encroach upon the rights of others.
This sounds simple enough, and it is likely that in early societies
law was, in fact, relatively simple. It is supposed to have revolved
around custom, the necessary restrictions being recognized by one
and all, with no expert guidance needed.
-A.B., B.S., 1908, University of South Carolina. M.D., 1912, Johns Hopkins University.
Honorary S.D., 1948, University of South Carolina.
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Everything points to the suggestion that over long periods of time
what we now speak of as law, governmental mandates under which
peoples live, was in large part synonymous with morals, and could
be expressed in moral maxims. Wise men became the moralists,
the formulators of moral precepts, and finally the collectors and custodians of rules of conduct that furthered the common interests.
These they expressed in attractive affirmative statements of things
that should be done in the interests of others. At the same time it
was found that mankind was given to the doing of things that he
should not do, and this led to the formulation of negative statements
or prohibition of such conduct. We see both of these approaches
to morals and law in the Ten Commandments: "honour thy father
and thy mother; thou shalt not steal".
Things that have come down to us from Confucius indicate that
his studies of the earliest Chinese records, imperfect because they
were inscribed on bamboo sticks, showed them to consist mainly of
chronicles and rules of conduct. These rules of conduct had come
into existence through human experience, the good accepted and the
bad rejected, and were made known to the general populace by word
of mouth. In this sense, Confucius was one of the most attractive
law-givers. The following is a sample of the high order of his
injunctions.
"In your secret chamber even you are judged;
See you do nothing to blush for
Though but the ceiling looks down upon you."
The State as such apparently made few formal laws. Law was a
matter of common knowledge, and each citizen was supposed to
understand it.
As society became more complex, it required a more and more
powerful government to control it. It became necessary for the
state to make laws, to record them in permanent form and to take
some steps to inform the citizens of them. The earliest of these socalled codes that has come down to us is that of Hammurabi, King
of Babylonia, carved on a column of rock some eight feet high, and
which lists the laws of the time. Even then the common citizen was
supposed to be able to interpret them, for copies were set up in
Babylon so that "anyone oppressed or injured, who had a tale of
woe to tell, might come and stand before his image, that of a king
of righteousness, and there read the priceless orders of the king,
and from the written monument solve his problem". The professional lawyer had not yet appeared on the scene.
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This simplicity could not last. States began to multiply in power
and in number, and the will of the state had to be expressed and
recorded in laws of ever increasing number and complexity. Pfeil
says that "knowledge of the law became the privilege of a class",
and, speaking of this course of events in English law, he says, "the
courts, making law from the material presented for their consideration, demanded skillful pleaders - and in the course of a few generations a learned profession arose". Thus, we are brought to the completion of the picture as we know it today, of state-made laws and
a legal profession to interpret them, and earning a livelihood from
the procedure.
In this country our body of laws is supposed to have remained
fairly static until the first third of the nineteenth century when agitation over slavery began to be reflected in laws governing that institution. Then came woman's rights and prohibition with all of the
legal meshwork surrounding them. When it is realized that all of
these matters were dealt with at both the national level and by all
of the separate states of the Union one can appreciate that such
simplicity as existedt was succeeded by multiplicity and complexity,
and that only a professional student of the law could be expected to
understand and unravel them. Now that we have the social welfare
legislation of the New Deal and Fair Deal eras, further complicated
by bureaucratic rulings, and confused by courts that have turned philosophical and in part political, we must turn to lawyers with some degree of hope, and a little less confidence, that they might find their
,way through the mystic maze of it all.
Law, in the abstract, is an idealistic conception- a set of rules
and regulations by which human society is ordered to the end that
justice may be had by all. For this to be accomplished these rules
should be simple, clear and understandable by people of average intelligence. We know that as of now this is not true. We find the
judges of our highest courts, men who have spent a life-time studying law, differing in the interpretation of laws, and I am told that
court decisions are no longer predictable on the basis of precedent
and previous decisions. Thus, the ideal and the real have drifted
apart, and the latter shows little evidence of striving toward the
former. The average citizen, instead of being informed as to law,
has become confused, somewhat amused, and decidedly cynical concerning it. He loses his amusement when he becomes enmeshed in
its workings.
The legal profession has a record of public service and accomplishment that is outstanding. In all of our branches of government it
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has played prominent parts. The close association of law and government places those who are trained in the law in favoured positions
for rendering such service, and America owes a debt of gratitude to
the legal profession in this connection. Many lawyers are men of
high thinking and high character, cultivated in an intellectual sense,
civic leaders and generally respected in their respective communities.
It is when the rank and file of lawyers display themselves as partisans
in litigation that the profession loses in public esteem and the law
itself comes in for criticism. Smollet describes Commodore Trunion
as "sweating with agony at the sight of an attorney", and it is more
or less fashionable to pretend that we all do.
The layman sees much to suggest that the laws have been made by
the lawyers for the lawyers, and that the complications of expression and intent contained in the laws afford occupation and profit
for the lawyers. Then, he sees in the lawyer one who is striving to
support a position, one who collects evidence for a preconceived idea,
one who will welcome truth if it serve his purpose, and one who will
hide the truth if it be to his interest to do so.
At its best, law becomes a definition of human rights, privileges,
obligations and prohibitions; at its worse, it becomes a confusion of
these same things.
MZDICINn

Medicine had its origin in mankind's desire to obtain relief from
pain, to recover from illness and injury and to prolong his life. It
is said that magic was the means through which he first sought such
relief- and where else could he turn. His mental life was peopled
with beneficent gods and evil demons, and his welfare depended
upon the cultivation of the one and the appeasing or avoiding of
the other.
As we have seen, the early law was of common knowledge. It was
man-made, based on human experience, the conduct expected was
clear and the penalties of misconduct plain. Not so with medicine.
The gods were concerned in the matter, and specially qualified people
were needed to propitiate them. These were found in the priests
and medicine-men - in the beginning one and the same. The common origin of religion and medicine was simply an expression of
early man's mystification concerning his coming forth, his going
hence, and the misfortunes that came during his journey through life.
The fact remains that he turned for medicine, as he did for religion,
to a specialized group who thought for him and did for him as best
they could.
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The ways of medicine and religion soon parted. Religion became
a corpus of beliefs, based on the assumption that the truth was
known through revelation or otherwise, and enquiry became unnecessary or ill-advised. Medicine found that it did not know, and that
its one hope of functioning well lay in the continued effort to find
out. The necessary parting of the ways is nicely expressed by
Gomperz who says, "when scientific doctrines are mixed up with
religious tenets, the same lifeless dogmatism will commonly benumb
them both". Medicine began to gather the crumbs from the table of
science, enjoyed the taste, and forthwith set out to develop a science
of its own.
There is no department of natural science that has not made its
contribution to medicine, and the so-called social sciences have also
come into the picture. Botany, zoology, biology, chemistry and physics, including nuclear physics, have laid the foundations of modern
medicine, and medicine has developed special techniques in all of
them as a means for investigating the structure and function of the
human body. Many microscopic causes of disease, both animal and
vegetable, have been identified, and their manner of operation determined. The body's reaction to such invasions have been studied,
and these reactions have become identifiable as a means of recognizing the agents that cause them. Remedies for combatting such infections have made spectacular progress. When they are properly used,
results are obtained in the clinic that are comparable to scientific
procedures in the laboratory. It is conceivable that in this phase of
medicine physicians might attain to the status of experts, capable of
giving authoritative opinions in courts or elsewhere.
The study of the human mind and emotions is another story.
Psychology has striven for scientific status. Introspective methods
brought much real information, and it is probable that they laid a
broad and substantial foundation of self-understanding through which
some understanding of others could be had. Such methods were
generally recognized, however, as being unscientific. They were not
susceptible of experimental approach and they were not productive
of irrefutable information. Behaviourism and experimental psychology appeared as objective attacks upon these problems, they made
their contributions, and had their limitations recognized. Freud put
his emphasis on the subconscious mind, initiating a movement that
has not yet run its course. Investigations in this field have added
somewhat to the understanding of the human mind, its evolution,
its manner of working, and its hopes, desires and fears. Like other
methods of approach it has left human psychology and psychiatry
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in the realm of probability and has come no where near reducing
them to certainty. It is in this field that the uncertainties of medicine lie. Mental and emotional reactions are component parts of all
illnesses and injuries, and they differ in kind and degree with each
individual concerned. An exact evaluation of them is many times
impossible. On the other hand, emotional urges, expressive of the
powerful influences of fear and love, may initiate disorders of bodily
function that are of such degree as to simulate disorders that are
caused by disease. And mental processes, rationalization of situations, giving rise to what we speak of as motives, may lead to forms
of conduct and pretended disabilities that are difficult to distinguish
from real ones. An appreciation of the limitations of knowledge in
this sphere is as near to the truth concerning it as we can come
today. Knowing that we do not know leaves us with a chance of
finding out; thinking that we know when we do not is the surest
way of not finding out. All too often it is here that law asks the aid
of medicine, and it is here that medicine is frequently unprepared
to speak with finality.
In summary, modern medicine has, in the past century, become in
part an exact science. Certain aspects of it are as firmly established
as are biology, chemistry and physics. A good deal of truth has
been found; much more remains to be sought. James Bryce expressed the idea by saying: "The more we know, the more we find
there is to know. And it is scarcely too much to say that our ignorance grows faster than our knowledge".
We come now to a consideration of the counterpart of the lawyer
in his relation to the law, the doctor, who does what we call practice medicine. The idealism of medicine, as I have tried to briefly
depict it, is such only in the abstract. When it is reduced to the
concrete plane of utilitarian application through the efforts of the
individual physician, the limitations of the mind and character of
the doctor are reflected upon medicine itself. There are many genuine medical scientists who are practicing medicine; there are those
who are earnest students of medicine; there are others who belong
to the class of skilled artisans; while the largest group of practitioners
are neither scientists nor students, are not too skilled in what they
do, and yet who accomplish much in the practice of their art. Dr.
Osler, not much given to cutting remarks, said that "it is astonishing
with how little reading a doctor can practice medicine, but it is not
astonishing how badly he may do it".
Medicine, in the abstract, is one of the most beautiful avenues
through which one may seek the truth and approach to an under-
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standing of man and his environment. It is a mental discipline of
high order, rigid in its demands for diversified knowledge, accurate
observation and logical thinking, productive of a high degree of
6atisfaction for those who come to it as scientists or students. But
the practice of medicine immediately falls below the scientific level,
whether the practitioner be scientist, student, or otherwise. For
utilitarianism requires that this be true, sympathy for suffering interferes with objectivity of thought; wishful thinking obtrudes itself upon the scene; coincidences lead to misinterpretation between"
cause and effect; hope and fear tear us away from mental integrity;
and adulation by patients is apt to destroy a becoming humility.
The degree to which the doctor may become aware of and resistant
to these satanic temptations will determine, in large part, his worthiness as a disciple of medicine as it stands today.
LAW AND MtDICINX

When we come to consider the contacts between law and medicine,
we must realize that such contacts must be made chiefly through
the lawyer on the one hand and the doctor on the other. We have
seen that both o.f them necessarily fall below the level of the best
that exists in their respective fields of knowledge, and we must be
prepared to see such contacts produce results that leave neither law
nor medicine altogether happy.
Efforts have been made at the educational level to make lawyers
and doctors more or less familiar with the science and art of each
other. Courses in medico-legal subjects have been taught in some
medical schools for many years, and we now have an announcement
of a law-science programme that has been instituted at Tulane. It
is said that a former professor of legal medicine "will serve also as
professor of law and professor of legal medicine in the College of
Law and the School of Medicine, respectively, the two divisions in
which the programme will operate at once". It is to be hoped
that good may come out of it, but it may prove to be another "noble
experiment". It smacks somewhat of an effort to mix oil and water,
and it seems to me highly probable that such a programme might
produce lawyers that are contaminated by medicine and doctors that
are contaminated by law, for little more than a smattering of the
one can be given to the other, and there is a risk, in all probability,
that both law students and medical students may be drawn away
from the straight lines of approach to their respective subjects.
At the educational level I should prefer to proceed with strict
observance of methods of approach, lines of thought, traditional
backgrounds, and aims ahead that are inherent, and basically differ-
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ent, in the two professions of law and medicine. The lawyer-doctor
and the doctor-lawyer might well prove to be an undesirable hybrid.
Integrity of thought and conduct are the common grounds on which
the lawyer and the doctor may meet, and our educational efforts
should endeavour to engender these qualities in both. "If a noble
disposition be planted in a young mind, it will engender a flower
that will endure to the end, and that no rain will destroy, nor will
it be withered by the drought". (Antiphon) Heraclitus observes that
there is "one thing that worthy men choose in preference to all
others- renown incorruptible". This is the sauce with which both
medical and legal education should be served. They would then have
common ground enough.
Efforts have also been made to enhance the value of medicine to
law through the establishment of jurisdictional bodies on which medical men sit. This has found application in some of the states,
especially in connection with insanity problems. Dr. E. H. Williams,
in his book, The Doctor in Court, portrays some of these tribunals
in action, and indicates that the plan has not worked too well.
It would seem that, as of now, contacts between law and medicine
must continue to be made chiefly through the lawyer on the one
hand and the doctor on- the other. Where we have good lawyers
and good doctors, such contacts may be good; where one of the two
be bad, the contacts may or may not be good; where both are bad,
the contacts can not be good.
Law asks of medicine questions dealing with mental competence,
of the reality or unreality of illness, and of the degree of disability
resulting from illness or injury. It must be readily apparent that
dogmatic answers to such questions are often impossible.
We have seen that psychology and psychiatry are far from scientific exactitude, some of their appraisals may be genuinely exact,
but all too often they are forced to conclusions that are based on
assumption and probability. Thus, we still see in court "experts"
on both sides of such questions.
The reality or unreality of illness is, at times, a difficult matter
to determine. In most instances a skillful physician, with the aid
of truly scientific procedures available to him, can arrive at a definite decision, so definite, now and then, that the decision is acceptable
even to a biased lawyer or to the individual concerned in the decision. On the other hand, even problems of this kind may be so
confusing as to leave honest doubt.
Questions concerning the existence and degree of disability following illness or injury present one of the most vexing problems that
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confront the medical profession. They are vexing because they are
nearly always difficult to unravel, they are vexing because the claimant's lawyer has, all too often, already arrived at his desired conclusion and is merely seeking evidence to support this conclusion, and
they are vexing because the claimant is striving to establish a claim,
not seeking relief in the medical sense. This maze of purpose and
motive makes the truth a very elusive thing, indeed.
Compensation for illness or injury, or for disability following
them, whether it be furnished by the government or insurance companies, immediately introduces the elements of suggestion and motive into the minds of sick or injured people, and certain groups of
lawyers are supposed to enhance these tendencies. The compensating agencies have set the trap for themselves, and they struggle
vainly when the trap springs. Suggestion may result, and often does,
in true neuroses in the persons concerned, and they may genuinely
think that they are more disabled than they really are, if we are to
base our estimates on physical consideration alone. My feeling is
that this group are really as disabled as they think they are, accepting Shakespeare's idea that "there is nothing either good or bad but
thinking makes it so". Where conscious motive becomes the spur
to claims for disability, we encounter a group who are exaggerators
and pretenders, the so-called malingerers. They are very real, I
can assure you, and in most instances can be recognized with complete satisfaction, as judged by medical standards alone. This recognition depends upon shades of differences in the mental, emotional
and physical reactions between the neurotic and the pretender, and
these differences may be far from clear to the medically inexperienced
lawyer, judge and jury. It is here that truth is seldom present and
almost never prevails.
The doctor in court is seldom happy, and is most often quite ineffective. He knows that he is on one side of a question that is
neither all black nor all white on either side, that efforts will be made
sooner or later to embarrass him, and that he must watch his step
if he is not to be discredited either as a physician or as a witness.
He realizes that "in every matter can the speaker's art awaken conflict by a double tongue", and that he is certain to be attacked by
someone who has been trained to the double tongue. If, however,
the doctor in court be not in fact a partisan, if he be wise enough to
state only what he knows, and if he be modest enough to say when
he does not know, he is well protected against attacks of opposing
lawyers. If he be alert, he may become the tormentor instead of the
tormentee.
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The ineffectiveness of honest medical testimony in court is sometimes quite disconcerting to the physician. This grief over the blindness of justice is, however, generally reserved to the young, conscientious physician who has not had time for life, in general, and
the law, in particular, to polish off some of his idealism. He will
not mind it so much later.
I recall my first appearance on the witness stand. It was in the
Federal Court in Columbia with Judge H. A. M. Smith presiding.
I had examined a young man who was claiming that an abdominal
hernia, which was plainly evident, had been caused by the sudden
stopping of a train that had thrown him against a wash-basin in
the smoking compartment. My examination indicated that the hernia was of long standing, as judged by the wasting of the tissues
around it, much too long to be accounted for by a recent accident.
I pointed, this out clearly on direct testimony. Then came the double
tongued lawyer on the other side who made me admit, not too reluctantly, that his client was a malingerer. I was cocked and primed,
fresh from text books that defined malingering and that gave detailed methods for detecting the malingerer. I was fairly launched
in this discourse, giving, as I thought, interesting and instructive information to the court and the jury, when the judge unceremoniously
interrupted me with the statement that the court had no time for a
lesson in medicine. I had been prepared to battle with the lawyer;
I was devoid of ammunition for the judge. I left the court somewhat puzzled and a little bit mad. When I read in the morning
paper that the jury had awarded damages to the plaintiff, a sense of
injustice was added to my reactions.
Yes, the paths of law and medicine must cross. The very nature
of things requires that such crossing must prove unsatisfactory for
both. Ostensibly, they are both seeking the truth, and, even if the
search were real, the thing sought is elusive enough. Dr. Osler tells
us that "in seeking absolute truth we aim at the unattainable, and
must be contented with broken portions". In reality, one side or
both, in legal contests, are frequently engaged in obscuring the truth,
and, under such conditions, even broken fragments are not recovered.
The hope of bettering the contacts between law and medicine must
rest on methods for making better lawyers and better doctors, better
in the sense of being better informed and better intentioned. Knowqledge must be tinctured with wisdom, and these two must travel in
the company of good characters. When we have a breed of lawyers
and doctors who are "honest in the dark and virtuous without a
witness", law and medicine may meet in court, happy and unashamed,
ready to restore some vision to a traditionally blind subject.
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